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THE CHANGING STANDARDS OF CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE REGULATION: THE REAL IMPACT 
OF MCCUTCHEON V. FEC 
Hannah Dunn∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), as 
amended by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), 
sets forth a variety of limits on financial campaign contributions “[t]o 
promote fair practices in the conduct of election campaigns,”1 
including dollar limitations on contributions and expenditures.2 
However, a recent Supreme Court case decided that limits on how 
much an individual may contribute in the aggregate are invalid under 
the First Amendment.3 Previously, the Supreme Court had generally 
upheld campaign finance controls as constitutionally proper to 
prevent corruption.4 While the Supreme Court has struck down some 
limitations on independent expenditures by individuals, the Court has 
also upheld individual contribution limits as constitutionally valid.5 
Legislative limits such as FECA have been viewed as “sufficient and 
proper [for] . . . the prevention of corruption.”6 
In 2014, the Supreme Court continued down a recent path of 
diversion from previous support of contribution limits7 in 
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1. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
2. 2 U.S.C. § 441a (2006).
3. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442 (2014).
4. Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of
Campaign Finance Laws—Supreme Court Cases, 19 A.L.R. FED. 2D 1, §§ 2, 10 (2007). 
5. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 29 (1976) (per curiam).
6. Rosenhouse, supra note 4, at § 2.
7. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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McCutcheon v. FEC8 by striking down the aggregate limits on 
campaign contributions set forth by 2 U.S.C. § 441a (“§ 441a”) 
(limiting individual donors to an overall total of $123,000 to 
candidates, national party committees, and certain political 
committees) as a First Amendment violation.9 The base limits in 
§ 441a (limiting donors to $2,600 per candidate), which were not
challenged, remain in effect.10
This Comment argues that although the Supreme Court should 
not have struck down the aggregate limits on individual campaign 
contributions in McCutcheon, the decision is unlikely to have a 
substantial practical impact on campaign finance—however, the 
decision has lasting legal implications. Part II of this Comment 
provides a roadmap of McCutcheon’s journey to the Supreme Court, 
and Part III outlines campaign finance regulation’s historical 
background. Part IV examines how the Court came to its conclusion. 
Part V discusses why the Court should have upheld the aggregate 
limits but contrasts the likelihood of little to no practical impact with 
a potentially substantial legal effect. Lastly, Part VI addresses the 
possible consequences of a significant legal impact and the future of 
campaign finance regulation. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
In the 2011–2012 election and in compliance with the base 
limits, Shaun McCutcheon contributed “a total of $33,088 to 16 
different federal candidates” and “a total of $27,328 to several 
noncandidate political committees.”11 McCutcheon wanted to donate 
additional money to other candidates and various political 
committees but was prevented from doing so by both the aggregate 
limit on candidate contributions and the aggregate limit on 
contributions to political committees.12 McCutcheon alleged that he 
plans to continue making similar contributions in the future and 
wants to donate “at least $60,000 to various candidates and $75,000 
8. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
9. Id. at 1442.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1443.
12. Id.
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to non-candidate political committees” in the 2013–2014 election.13 
Moreover, Republican National Committee (RNC) would like to 
receive McCutcheon’s desired contributions as well as donations 
from other “similarly situated individuals.”14 
B. Procedural History
McCutcheon and the RNC filed a complaint with the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia in June 2012, arguing that 
the aggregate limits set forth under § 441a unconstitutionally 
violated the First Amendment.15 McCutcheon and the RNC moved 
for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the aggregate 
limits, which was met by the FEC’s motion to dismiss the case.16 The 
district court granted the FEC’s motion to dismiss, concluding the 
aggregate limits were proper under the First Amendment because 
they “prevented evasion of the base limits.”17 More specifically, the 
court determined that although it was unlikely that many separate 
entities would conspire to pool donation resources for a single 
donor’s benefit, “such a scenario [was] ‘not hard to imagine.’”18 
Therefore, the district court saw the aggregate and base limits as a 
“coherent system rather than . . . individual limits,” thus rejecting the 
constitutional challenge to the aggregate limits.19 McCutcheon and 
the RNC then directly appealed to the Supreme Court to challenge 
the aggregate limits’ constitutionality.20 
III. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
The First Amendment protects an individual’s right to 
participate in the democratic process through political 
contributions.21 However, that right is not absolute. Spurred by 
beliefs that “aggregated capital unduly influence[s] politics” and 
“concern with the ‘political potentialities of wealth’ and their 
‘untoward consequences for the democratic process,’”22 Congress 
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1443–44.
19. Id. at 1444.
20. Id.
21. U.S. CONST., amend. I, § 2.
22. Rosenhouse, supra note 4, at § 2.
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enacted legislation such as FECA to curb opportunities for 
corruption by placing limits and enforcing regulations on campaign 
finance.23 
These limits, as amended by BCRA, allowed individuals to 
contribute a maximum of $2,600 per election to any given candidate; 
$32,400 per year to a national party committee; $10,000 per year to a 
state or local party committee; and $5,000 per year to a political 
action committee (“PAC”).24 Section 441a(a) outlined two types of 
campaign contribution limits: “base limits,” and “aggregate limits.”25 
The former controls how much money an individual may donate to a 
particular candidate or committee, and the latter controls how much 
money an individual may donate in total to any and all candidates 
and committees.26 The U.S. Supreme Court has, in the past, 
recognized limits on campaign contributions as constitutionally 
protected to limit corruption. In Buckley v. Valeo,27 the Supreme 
Court found “the weighty interests served by restricting the size of 
financial contributions to political candidates are sufficient to justify” 
contribution limits28 and upheld restrictions set forth by BCRA on 
contributions beyond federal limits29 in McConnell v. FEC.30 More 
recently, the Supreme Court has moved away from the protection of 
contribution limits and engaged in a string of decisions that chip 
away at the foundation of regulated campaign finance. In Citizens 
United v. FEC,31 a ban on independent corporate expenditures was 
struck down as an unconstitutional suppression of speech.32 And, as 
stated above, in McCutcheon, the aggregate limits imposed by § 441a 
were found invalid under the First Amendment.33 
23. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
24. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1442.
25. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971.
26. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1443.
27. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
28. Id. at 29.
29. Id.
30. 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
31. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
32. Id. at 310.
33. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442 (2014).
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IV. THE COURT’S REASONING
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the plurality opinion of the Court 
and was joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Alito.34 Justice 
Thomas filed a concurring opinion, and Justice Breyer wrote a 
dissenting opinion in which Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and 
Kagan joined.35 Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion emphasized the 
importance of the basic right to participate in democracy and that the 
First Amendment protects political participation by way of political 
contribution.36 The decision acknowledges that campaign 
contributions may be limited to “protect against corruption or the 
appearance of corruption,” however regulations must specifically 
target “quid pro quo” corruption (recognized as a “direct exchange of 
an official act for money”).37 The statute at issue in McCutcheon 
involves aggregate limits as well as base limits, the latter of which 
the Court has “previously upheld as serving the permissible objective 
of combating corruption.”38 Here, the Court recognized that the 
aggregate limits also serve an anti-corruption function by 
“preventing circumvention of the base limits,” but aggregate limits 
ultimately do not adequately solve that issue while simultaneously 
limiting an individual’s political participation.39 
The Court rejected the FEC’s argument that the aggregate limits 
are constitutionally valid because the limits work to prevent 
circumvention of the base limits, pointing out that legislative 
measures against circumvention enacted since the Buckley decision 
have only increased and strengthened.40 Furthermore, the Court 
found the argument that “an individual ‘might contribute massive 
amounts of money to a particular candidate through the use of 
unearmarked contributions’ to entities likely to support the 
candidate” speculative and unconvincing—the Court has long found 
“mere conjecture” inadequate to fulfill a “First Amendment 
burden.”41 Because the statute could not effectively further the 
governmental interest in preventing circumvention of the base limits 
34. Id. at 1440.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1440–41.
37. Id. at 1441.
38. Id. at 1442.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1446.
41. Id. at 1452.
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nor quid pro quo corruption, it “impermissibly restrict[ed] 
participation in the political process.”42 Ultimately, the Court 
concluded that the interest in preventing corruption is extremely 
important to the democratic process, but this interest is limited to 
quid pro quo corruption, and limits that do not address this interest 
restrict citizens’ First Amendment rights.43 
V. ANALYSIS
A. Aggregate Limits Are Not Constitutionally Invalid
The Supreme Court should not have struck down the aggregate 
limits on campaign contributions enacted by § 441a. Previously, the 
Court has upheld limits as a constitutionally valid way to prevent 
corruption associated with campaign contributions.44 McCutcheon 
held that there is no constitutional justification for preventing a 
wealthy individual from giving the maximum possible donation to 
any and all candidates desired, asserting that as long as each donation 
stays within the still-in-place individual limits, it is unlikely any 
individual candidate will be unjustly influenced by financial 
contributions.45 But this argument is unpersuasive. As Paul Smith 
points out, “there remains no justification for regulation even if all of 
these donations are packaged so that a single multi-member check is 
handed to a senior member of Congress, and even if the check buys 
the donor the right to meet and socialize with the party’s senior 
leadership regularly.”46 Chief Justice Roberts addressed this problem 
within McCutcheon’s opinion, allowing that “when donors furnish 
widely distributed support within all applicable base limits, all 
members of the party . . . may benefit, and the leaders of the party or 
cause may feel particular gratitude.”47 However, rather than 
recognizing this problem as a situation ripe for corruption, Roberts 
42. Id. at 1457.
43. Id. at 1461–62.
44. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam); Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC,
453 U.S. 182 (1981); FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 
(2003), overruled in part by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
45. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1448–49.
46. Paul Smith, Symposium: McCutcheon Opens the Door to Massive Party Spending, But
Four Justices Continue to Push Back Forcefully, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 3, 2014, 12:20 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/04/symposium-mccutcheon-opens-the-door-to-massive-party 
-contributions-but-four-justices-continue-to-push-back-forcefully/.
47. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1461.
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considers it a normality of the political process, “in which party 
members join together to further common political beliefs, and 
citizens can choose to support a party because they share some, most, 
or all of those beliefs.”48 
In McConnell, the Court found limits on “soft money”49 
donations to be constitutionally valid because large soft-money 
donations could potentially give an individual donor undue political 
influence.50 In the McCutcheon dissent, Justice Breyer highlights the 
inconsistency between the decision in McConnell and McCutcheon, 
noting that despite no concrete “evidence of bribery or vote buying 
in exchange for donations of nonfederal money,” the record showed 
massive soft-money contributions “enabled wealthy contributors to 
gain disproportionate ‘access to federal lawmakers’ and the ability to 
‘influence legislation.’”51 In McConnell, this was substantial 
evidence to demonstrate constitutional validity of soft-money 
limits,52 in contrast with the narrow definition of corruption in the 
McCutcheon decision, requiring actual occurrences of quid pro quo 
corruption.53 
B. The Practical Impact of McCutcheon
Setting aside whether McCutcheon was decided correctly, the 
decision is unlikely to have a substantial practical impact. Critics of 
the McCutcheon decision feared that “Buckley itself is on the 
chopping board” and that soon enough the court will do away with 
all campaign contribution limits, bringing forth unlimited and 
unrestricted campaign contribution.54 This argument is unconvincing 
for several reasons. First, McCutcheon did not overturn Buckley—the 
Court expressly notes this within the decision, stating that the issues 
of Buckley were not at issue in McCutcheon.55 Second, donors could 
48. Id.
49. Money other than “hard money”—“contributions made for the purpose of influencing an
election for federal office.” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 93 (2003). 
50. Id. at 145.
51. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1469–70 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
52. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 145.
53. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1438.
54. Mark E. Elias & Jonathan S. Berkon, After McCutcheon, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 373, 373
(2014). 
55. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1445.
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already dodge the aggregate limits through super PAC donations56—
although the aggregate limits did present an obstacle, McCutcheon’s 
decision has merely made what was already somewhat possible 
easier to execute. Third, the impact of a McCutcheon-like decision 
has been seen elsewhere—i.e., the aftermath of Citizens United57 as 
well as the removal of aggregate limits at the state level.58 Lastly, 
Shaun McCutcheon is arguably the exception, rather than the rule—it 
is unlikely that there is a large pool of similarly situated 
individuals.59 
1. The Problem of Super PACs
In 2010, the political process saw the rise of the “‘Super PAC’—
a political action committee legally entitled to raise donations in 
unlimited amounts.”60 Citizens United set forth the Supreme Court’s 
holding that independent expenditures do not create the same 
opportunities for corruption (or appearance of corruption) as 
identified in Buckley.61 A Super PAC “makes independent 
expenditures expressly supporting or opposing candidates for federal 
office, but does not make any contributions to federal candidates.”62 
While both PACs and Super PACs have the ability to spend without 
restriction, Super PACs additionally can accept unlimited 
contributions “from individuals, corporations, and unions.”63 
Despite its differences from an ordinary PAC, the Super PAC’s 
political power and linkage to certain candidates and parties cannot 
be denied. In 2010, the highest-spending Super PACs were “broadly 
ideological, partisan, or connected to traditional interest groups.”64 
The 2011–2012 election cycle saw a radical shift, in which almost all 
leading Super PACs focused on support for a specific candidate “or 
56. Sean Sullivan, Everything You Need to Know About McCutcheon v. FEC, WASH. POST
(Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/10/08/supreme-court 
-takes-up-the-sequel-to-citizens-united/.
57. Jan Baran, Symposium: McCutcheon and the Future of Campaign Finance Regulations,
SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 4, 2014, 2:59 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/04/symposium 
-mccutcheon-and-the-future-of-campaign-finance-regulation/.
58. Elias & Berkon, supra note 54, at 377.
59. Baran, supra note 57.
60. Richard Briffault, Super PACs, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1644, 1644 (May 2012).
61. Id. at 1645.
62. Id. at 1646.
63. Id. at 1647.
64. Id. at 1675.
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were formed at the behest of party leaders.”65 Although McCutcheon 
certainly makes it easier for an individual to donate larger amounts to 
a variety of candidates, before the decision it would have arguably 
been possible through donations to a Super PAC as well. As Robert 
K. Kelner (“Kelner”) points out, “Major donors never stopped
writing big checks after McCain-Feingold [FECA]. They just wrote
them to unregulated outside groups . . . and other . . . political
vehicles.”66
Thus, McCutcheon is not likely to have the staggering impact 
warned by critics.67 Even if individuals began donating on a massive 
scale, it is unlikely that they will “materially” impact the “relative 
advantage held by unregulated outside groups.”68 It is the Super 
PACs’ troubling and rising power that holds the potential to 
drastically alter the landscape of campaign finance.69 McCutcheon is, 
as Kelner puts it, a mere “ripple on the campaign finance pond, not a 
tsunami.”70 
2. Prior Occurrences
a. The Lackluster Impact of Citizens United
Those who see McCutcheon as a death knell for campaign 
finance regulation may have forgotten that such a decision is not a 
novel occurrence. Citizens United struck down limits on corporate 
campaign spending,71 a decision for which “the Court [took] a brutal 
battering in the court of public opinion.”72 Described as an 
“astonishingly naïve decision”73 that was a “shocking instance of 
judicial overreach,”74 some predicted it would “unleash up to $1 
trillion in corporate money for attack ads in the next election 
65. Id.
66. Robert K. Kelner, The Practical Consequences of McCutcheon, 127 HARV. L. REV. F.
380, 384 (2014). 
67. Elias & Berkon, supra note 54, at 373.
68. Kelner, supra note 66, at 384.
69. See id. at 386.
70. Id.
71. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876, 911 (2010).
72. Joel Gora, Symposium: McCutcheon v. FEC and the Fork in the Road, SCOTUSBLOG
(Aug. 15, 2013, 10:18 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/08/symposium-mccutcheon-v-fec 
-and-the-fork-in-the-road/.
73. E.J. Dionne, Jr., Op-Ed., A Bipartisan Push to Clean Up the Supreme Court’s Mess,
WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/07 
/AR2010030702679.html. 
74. Id.
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cycle.”75 While undoubtedly a departure from previous judicial 
precedent, the Citizens United decision yielded a relatively minor 
practical impact.76 In fact, while the amount of money spent in 
subsequent elections did rise, it did not do so more rapidly than it had 
in preceding elections.77 Thus, the “stampede” of money President 
Obama predicted in his 2010 State of the Union address to result 
from the Citizens United decision failed to materialize.78 Radical 
Supreme Court decisions do not always garner radical results—just 
because McCutcheon is a dramatic change does not mean it will 
bring forth immediate dramatic change. 
b. Limits at the State Level
Following on the heels of the McCutcheon decision, officials in 
Maryland and Massachusetts “have announced that they would not 
enforce their states’ aggregate limits.”79 The decision also influenced 
Wisconsin to stop enforcing its aggregate limit—previously, donors 
in Wisconsin could only contribute an overall total of $10,000 per 
year to “all registered Wisconsin committees (including candidates, 
parties, and PACs) . . . but did not separately limit what [an] 
individual could contribute to a party committee or PAC.”80 The 
2011 and 2012 recall elections in Wisconsin reported high numbers 
from outside-group spending,81 showing that the aggregate limits 
merely forced restricted donors to get creative. Marc E. Elias and 
Jonathan S. Berkon predict that the change in Wisconsin law “will 
give the parties a chance to regain their influence” through in-state 
donors no longer restricted by aggregate limits,82 rather than bring in 
a mass influx of unlimited and corruptive contributions. 
75. Jon Talton, Supreme Court’s Momentous Decision Will Derail Any Financial Reform,
SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 21 2010, 10:05 AM), http://blogs.seattletimes.com/jontalton/2010/01/21 
/supreme_courts_momentous_decis/. 
76. Baran, supra note 57.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Maryland and Massachusetts are two of the twelve states that have similar aggregate
limits in place. Elias & Berkon, supra note 54, at 377. 
80. Id. at 378.
81. See id.
82. Id.
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3. Shaun McCutcheon: One of a Very Few of a Kind
McCutcheon wrote checks to sixteen candidates in the 2012 
election before hitting the aggregate limit while lamenting his 
inability to write checks to an additional ten candidates he wished to 
support and, as Jan Baran puts it, “had the charming patriotic habit of 
making his checks payable in the amount of $1776”83—it cannot be 
denied that McCutcheon is a unique individual. Beyond his 
contribution idiosyncrasies, however, is the fact that McCutcheon 
(and fellow like-minded donors) make up a very small population of 
individuals—extraordinarily wealthy and willing to spread that 
wealth around to a large number of candidates. The dissent in 
McCutcheon lays out a diabolical hypothetical in which individuals 
“contribute to every candidate and every committee . . . thereby 
dispens[ing] over $3 million in contributions.”84 It is unlikely that 
McCutcheon-esque donors will give to more candidates than 
previously to make a substantial impact, and the McCutcheon 
decision will likely result only in a modest increase in “funding in a 
system that during 2011–2012 saw $7.2 billion raised and spent.”85 
Since the Court’s ruling in McCutcheon, only 310 donors have 
surpassed the aggregate limits previously in place.86 Overall, the 
donors gave $50.2 million—$11.6 million more than permitted pre-
McCutcheon.87 While $11.6 million is no figure to scoff at, when 
viewed in relation to an overall funding system capable of raising 
$7.2 billion,88 it is nothing more than a drop in a bucket. While the 
McCutcheon decision is recent enough that contribution data remains 
unavailable, McCutcheon will result in only minor changes in overall 
contributions.89 Donors responded to earlier limitations and 
regulations on contributions by funneling money through Super 
PACs90—while the money stays consistent, the channels change. 
83. Baran, supra note 57.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Chris Cillizza, How McCutcheon Has Already Changed Campaign Finance, in 1 Chart,
WASH. POST (Sep. 2, 2014), www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/09/02/how 
-mccutcheon-has-already-changed-campaign-finance-in-1-chart/.
87. Id.
88. Baran, supra note 57.
89. And, perhaps instances of decreased contributions to Super PACs and other
less-regulated political vehicles. 
90. See Sullivan, supra note 56.
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C. The Legal Impact of McCutcheon
As discussed above, McCutcheon’s practical impact will be 
minor. The legal implications of the decision, however, may pose 
more serious consequences. 
The decision in McCutcheon is another91 step down a new path 
for the Court—one that is steadily overturning forty years of national 
policy and thirty-eight years of judicial precedent.92 Since Buckley in 
1976, the Court has “consistently upheld the constitutionality of 
federal contribution limits.”93 The Buckley Court characterized 
aggregate limits as “modest restraint”94 appropriate for the purpose 
of curbing financial corruption, while the McCutcheon Court found 
no constitutional basis for such limits.95 
Such a departure from precedent raises questions about the 
decision’s legal impact. While the Court upheld individual and base 
limits, future plaintiffs will likely challenge those limits. What was 
considered constitutionally kosher in 1976 has become 
constitutionally invalid today.96 While this is perhaps an overly 
dramatic snowball effect argument, it is possible that the Court will 
continue to chip away at campaign regulation until very little or no 
regulation remains. 
VI. CONCLUSION
While McCutcheon should not have struck down the aggregate 
limits set forth by § 441a, the decision in practical terms likely left 
current campaign finance law unchanged Super PAC donations 
already existed as an avenue around the aggregate limits, and a large 
cohort of political supporters with the resources and donation 
ambitions of Shaun McCutcheon most likely does not exist.97 
However, McCutcheon represents another step taken by the Supreme 
Court toward less and less regulation of campaign finance,98 
91. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
92. See Fred Wertheimer, The McCutcheon Case: Consequences If SCOTUS Strikes Down
Overall Contribution Limits, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 25, 2014, 4:55 PM), 
www.huffingtonpost.com/fred-wertheimer/the-mccutcheon-v-fec-case-sotus_b_4849278.html. 
93. Id.
94. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 38 (1976) (per curiam).
95. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442 (2014).
96. Id. at 1465 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
97. See Baran, supra note 57.
98. See Wertheimer, supra note 92.
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highlighting its likely substantial legal impact. As Supreme Court 
decisions move away from Buckley and toward McCutcheon, the 
standard of actively regulating campaign finance grows dimmer and 
may one day completely vanish. Corruptive campaign finance 
strategies serve no valid purpose in the political process and must be 
eliminated. While McCutcheon may seem innocuous in terms of 
practical impact, the legal precedent it reinforces could drastically 
alter the political landscape. 
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